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Abstract—Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) has been broadly
suggested as an efficient solution for problem of fair allocation of
multiple resources, namely bandwidth allocation in datacenters.
In spite of being thoroughly studied, and provably strategy-
proof for most scenarios, NBS-based allocation methods lack re-
search on strategic behavior of tenants in case of proportionality
of resource demands, which is common in datacenter workloads.
We found that misbehavior is beneficial: by lying about
bandwidth demands tenants can improve their allocations. We
show that the sequence of selfish improvements leads to trivial
demand vectors for all tenants. It essentially breaks sharing
incentives which are very important for datacenter networks.
We analytically prove that tenants can misbehave for 2 and 3
tenants cases.
We show that misbehavior is possible in one recently proposed
NBS-based allocation system if demands proportionality is taken
into account. Monte-Carlo simulations were done for 2 − 15
tenants to show a misbehavior possibility and its impact on
aggregated bandwidth.
We propose to use another game-theoretic approach to allocate
bandwidth in case of proportional demands. That method per-
forms significantly better on average than NBS after misbehavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent studies on datacenter networking show that best-
effort protocols harm tenants’ performance [1]. Many modern
network applications, e.g. Hadoop, utilize multiple resources
at once. The performance of the whole application depends
on each resource it uses: the stragglers increase application
completion time and reduce quality of services (QoS). To deal
with this problem network allocation methods were suggested.
The problem can easily be widen to a general class of resource
allocations, where overall performance or utility depends on
the allocation of a less available resource.
Recent works suggest using game-theoretic approach to get
required allocations of resources [2]. Classical approach to
resource allocation is a Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS)[3].
Allocations of some flows are considered variables and opti-
mization problem is constructed. Objective function is to max-
imize multiplication of all allocations subjected to bandwidth
and demand constraints.
The same NBS allocation can be achieved in another way
by using a pricing scheme or auction. In this approach each
player with given budget can obtain share of each resource
adjusting spending to acquire more desirable resources. All
resources have some prices, which are adjusted according
to demands. The repeating process of adjusting converges to
Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (CEEI) which
coincides with NBS in many pricing schemes. Different in
nature pricing schemes produce the same allocation after
market-clearing price is found. Moreover, one of the main
conditions of a perfect market — the price-taking property,
a property representing the absence of ability to manipulate
the prices — is absent in many cases. Without the latter
property resource management algorithms create space for
player misbehavior. This often is forgotten during designing
of new protocols for network allocations.
In this work we argue that application of game-theoretic
and pricing mechanisms to bandwidth allocation in many
cases does not satisfy the condition. Namely, then tenants’
demands for bandwidth on different links are proportional.
Players have the power to manipulate prices by increasing their
demands on some resource which increases it’s clearing price
and forces other players to spend larger part of their budget on
that resource. This decreases other players’ share of another
resource, which a manipulating player actually requires.
We construct a game for proportional network resources
demands and prove that this manipulability breaks sharing
incentives1 for 2-player and 3-player game. For the 2-player
game we produce an explicit solution, but 3-player game is
more important for general case (we do not show an exact
solution for 3-player game, but provide the proof for breaking
of sharing incentives). To support our findings we simulate the
game for 2-15 players competing for 2-15 links and show that
misbehavior results in degradation of final allocation, where
each player receives only 1/N -th of each resource, where n
is the number of players. This finding is similar to the tragedy
of the commons – a known problem of game theory where
selfish individuals increasing own short-term profit decrease
the long-term profit of the whole system (and as a result
of everyone). We compare our findings against dominant
resource fairness (DRF) allocation method [4] as a strategy-
proof baseline. We show that NBS allocation mechanisms
produce good allocation result, however ability of each player
to strategically manipulate demands degrades the allocations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides motivation for the addressed problem. Section III
formally defines compared allocation mechanisms. Section IV
provides a proof of misbehavior for 2-player case. Section V
presents a proof of misbehavior for the case of 3 players.
In section VI we provide results of simulations and discuss
impact of misbehavior on quality of resource allocation. Sec-
tion VII reviews related work and section VIII concludes the
1A sharing incentive is an important property of multi-tenant or multi-user
system. With this incentive the user can trade some of her rightful resources
she does not need at the moment for another resource she could benefit
from. The absence of sharing incentives among N users is similar to the
fact that each of the users will receive only 1
N
of each resource. The latter
in many cases results in huge performance degradation of the system as well
as individual users, as many resources remain under-utilized.
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II. MOTIVATION
There are many examples where several resources are
related. Players, requesting these resources, need all of them
in some proportions. This comes from the fact that if a
player misses some part of some resource then the whole
process starts to lag behind, waiting for the straggler. In that
case we say that demands are proportional. This is common
scenario for any non-trivial multistage process. Especially we
find such examples in modern datacenter and private cluster
applications. We focus on that model in this paper.
Many applications, especially in datacenters, revolve around
the notion of jobs. Each job requires bandwidth from several
links, and these requirements are related: overall utility of
an application is defined by the bottleneck link. Obvious
examples of such applications are computation frameworks,
such as Hadoop or Dryad. The job in these systems is not
complete unless a transfer on a slowest link is finished.
For clarity we give a small motivating example and provide
a formal definition of a job model for network bandwidth
allocation. This scatter-and-gather work-flow is common in
datacenters.
An example (Fig. 1). Imagine we have a tenant which has
three virtual machines (VMs) — A, B and C — designated for
some job. The job is processed as following: VM A (master
node) receives the job, splits it into two tasks, sends them to
VMs B and C (workers) and collects the results. On a high
level, the performance of the entire job is measured by the
time VM A receives the last result. For simplicity assume that
CPU time for tasks is the same for both workers or negligible
in comparison to communication time.
We are interested in finding the amount of resource allocated
to communication channels A–B and A–C. For a moment,
imagine that on the channel A–B communication time is 10
ms and on the channel A–C it is 100 ms. Independently of
the performance on the channel A–B, the entire task will not
complete in time faster than 100 ms. In other words, this means
that the performance of the task is determined by the slowest
channel. Moreover, there is no benefit in utilizing the excess
bandwidth on a non-bottleneck channel A–B at the job level,
on another hand, the excess bandwidth may be given to or
traded with another tenant.
The aforementioned problem can be solved if the tenant
could explicitly proclaim how many bits per second she needs
on channel A–B for every bit per second on channel A–C.
This requirement leads us to the following definition of the
job model.
Definition 1 (Job model). A set of communication tasks (job)
of a tenant is defined by a set of virtual machines S and
bandwidth requirements D for a set of links L over which the
communication between these machines occurs. The job is said
to be limited (after resource allocation) by the smallest ratio
(AlDl ) between allocated (Al) and demanded (Dl) bandwidth
at some bottleneck link l (the slowest task in the set).
In other words, this means that an increase in the allocated
bandwidth Al′ on some non-bottleneck link l′ 6= l, will not
improve the performance of the job, since equal proportion-
ality between demanded and allocated bandwidths must be
observed for all tasks (involved in the given job). This model
leads to a natural definition of utility of a tenant — the smallest
ratio between allocated and demanded bandwidth over all links
in the network.
For simplicity, we limit ourselves to communication tasks.
However, the limitation is not crucial. The model can be
extended to a mixture of communication, computational and
memory resource sharing. The latter requires some unified
metric to make them comparable, for example, the completion
time. Master node can send a task over a slow link to a fast
machine, or over a fast link to a slow machine, the completion
time defines what is preferred.
We consider that each tenant has only one job. Utility of
each tenant is proportional to a minimal ratio of amount of al-
located resource to amount of demanded among all resources.
We call a set of tenant’s demands for all resources — a
demand vector. Because each tenant desires to get as much
resources as possible, we are not interested in absolute values
of tenants’ demands. We have to consider only their relative
values. Therefore, demand vectors of all tenants should be
normalized. We suggest to divide all demands of a single
tenant by the maximal demand of her. This results in all values
of demand vectors to not exceed 1. As in DRF [4], we call
the resource with the maximum demand dominant resource
for each tenant, as it dominants her demands.
III. ALLOCATION MECHANISMS
A. Pricing mechanism
We now consider a pricing mechanism to allocate several
goods (link capacities, spectrum, virtual machine resources)
to several players. For simplicity, we consider all resources
to have equal capacity of 1 (we can always normalize it this
way). A pricing mechanism is a set of prices p ∈ Rm+ , where
m is a number of resources to be allocated, i.e. each good has
a price associated with it. Each player tries to maximize her
utility, while not exceeding the fixed budged of 1. Let xi be
utility of a player i and di ∈ [0, 1]m be her demand vector (as
discussed above, it is normalized).
Then, given set of prices, utility of a player i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
will be defined by:
xi =
1∑m
j=1 pjdij
It follows from the fact, that each player buys resources in
proportion to her demands.
However, that computation does not account for limited
resource stocks. At that point prices have to be adjusted
according to market principles — lower the price if total
demand is less than supply, and raise it if demand exceeds
supply. More formally, total demand TDj is defined by:
TDj =
n∑
i=1
xidij =
n∑
i=1
dij∑m
k=1 pkdik
Price pj should be lowered, if TDj < 1, and raised if
TDj > 1. Although this scheme does not converges in all
possible scenarios, in a given model it always converges to
Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (CEEI), which
also corresponds to the Nash Bargaining Solution [5], [6].
B. Nash Bargaining Solution
NBS is defined by the following optimization problem:
n∏
i=1
xi → max
subject to
n∑
i=1
xidij ≤ 1, j = 1..m
xi ≥ 0, i = 1..n
(1)
Resulting allocation is unique and defined by demand vec-
tors. It is Pareto efficient and envy free, i.e. it is an optimal al-
location for given demand vectors. However, by adjusting their
demand vectors players can manipulate allocations, increasing
their utilities. For example, consider 2-tenant, 2-resource case
with demand vectors as follows:
d1 =
(
1, 12
)
, d2 =
(
1
3 , 1
)
These demands will result in following utilities:
x1 =
4
5 , x2 =
3
5
However, if player 2 will increase her demand vector to d′2 =(
1
2 , 1
)
, utilities will be:
x1 =
2
3 , x2 =
2
3
Here the second player managed to increase her allocations
by lying about her demands. Such misbehavior essentially
removes sharing incentives, as shown in sections IV-VI.
C. Dominant Resource Fairness Allocation
DRF allocation is a strategy-proof allocation method there
no misbehavior is possible by design. Main difference from
NBS is that utilities of all players are forced to be equal.
We denote this common utility as X . Then X is maximized
subject to the same constraints as in NBS:
X → max
subject to
n∑
i=1
Xdij ≤ 1, j = 1..m
X ≥ 0
(2)
This optimization problem is trivial and can be solved
explicitly:
X = min
j=1..m
1∑n
i=1 dij
DRF is obviously strategy-proof and no misbehavior is
possible as allocations of all players are forced to be equal.
Therefore any beneficial behavior of any tenant will always
increase all allocations. However, equalization of all utilities
restrain possible allocations space. Therefore DRF produces
lower total utilization of resources.
IV. TWO PLAYERS CASE PROOF
First of all, let us consider a 2-player case (i.e. n = 2). 2-
player game allows an explicit solution as well as intuitively
easy to understand. Same idea will be utilized in a more
general case. Without loss of generality, let us also set the
number of resources to 2 (m = 2). The proof can be
easily extended to multiple resources and two players. We
reformulate problem (1) as follows:
ln(x) + ln(y)→ max
subject to
x+ b · y ≤ 1,
a · x+ y ≤ 1,
x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0,
(3)
where demand vectors are d1 = (1, a), d2 = (b, 1),
0 < a < 1, 0 < b < 1. We are interested only in that case
because sharing incentives are presented only here. If both
players would want more of the first resource, allocation will
not depend on their demands of the second resource at all.
Therefore both players will put whole budget on the same
bottlenecked resource leaving another one without attention.
Example of misbehavior can be seen on Figure 2. If optimal
point is at the corner of feasible solutions set (grey area),
player A can increase her demand for second resource. This
will shift line bounding feasible set corresponding to he second
resource to the left. Which then will shift intersection point
to the right, increasing allocation of tenant A from x1 to x2.
This procedure can be continued until intersection point will
stop being an optimal solution.
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Fig. 2. Misbehavior example for 2-player case.
Because all constraints for variables x and y are linear we
can apply the method of Lagrange multipliers and Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker conditions [7]:
Theorem 1 (KKT conditions). There exist λ ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0 such
that:
x = 1λ+a·µ
y = 1b·λ+µ
λ(x+ b · y − 1) = 0
µ(a · x+ y − 1) = 0
Proof. Let λ ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0, α ≥ 0, and β ≥ 0 denote
Lagrange multipliers for 4 constraints from problem (3). Then,
the Lagrangian of the problem is:
L(x, y, λ, µ, α, β) = ln(x) + ln(y)
−λ(x+ b · y − 1)− µ(a · x+ y − 1) + α · x+ β · y (4)
Giving the necessary and sufficient conditions for the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions:
∇L(x, y, λ, µ, α, β) = 0⇐⇒
1
x − λ− µ · a+ α = 0
1
y − λ · b− µ+ β = 0
(5)
λ(x+ b · y − 1) = 0
µ(a · x+ y − 1) = 0 (6)
x · α = 0
y · β = 0 (7)
Because it is obvious that x > 0 and y > 0, holds α = 0
and β = 0. Thus we can omit equations (7), and find x and y
from (5).
Following theorem 1 there are 3 points satisfying necessary
conditions:
λ 6= 0, µ 6= 0⇐⇒{
x+ b · y = 1
a · x+ y = 1
(8)
λ 6= 0, µ = 0⇐⇒
x+ b · y = 1
x = 1λ
y = 1b·λ
a · x+ y < 1
(9)
λ = 0, µ 6= 0⇐⇒
a · x+ y = 1
x = 1a·µ
y = 1µ
x+ b · y < 1
(10)
Equations (8)–(10) lead to following possible solutions:
x = 1−b1−a·b , y =
1−a
1−a·b (11)
x = 12 , y =
1
2·b , 1 ≤ b · (2− a) (12)
x = 12·a , y =
1
2 , 1 ≤ a · (2− b) (13)
It is easy to see, that conditions (12) and (13) are mutually
exclusive (see Figure 3). Note, that if either of points (12)
and (13) is available, it is a global maximum. Consider 1 ≤
b · (2 − a), therefore point x = 12 , y = 12·b is available. Both
points (12) and (11) are on the same line x + b · y = 1 and
point (12) is a maximum for a given objective function on that
line. Therefore, it is a global maximum.
Theorem 2 (Misbehavior for 2 players). For each 0 < a < 1
and 0 < b < 1 it is possible to either increase a, or increase b
in such a way, that new NBS defined by problem (3) will have
larger utility x (after increasing a) or y (after increasing b).
Proof. Consider parameters space in Figure 3. Two lines b ·
(2− a) = 1 and a · (2− b) = 1 separate that space into three
zones:
Zone I: Only point (11) is available. Utilities of players
are: x = 1−b1−a·b , y =
1−a
1−a·b . Note, that this zone doesn’t
include borders. Therefore it is possible for player 1 to increase
a until a · (2− b) = 1. Let that new demand value be a′. New
allocation of player 1 will be:
1−b
1−a′·b >
1−b
1−a·b
New allocation is larger than what player 1 had. Note, that
after increase both possible points (11) and (13) coincide.
Figure 3 shows that transition from point 1.
Zone II: Point (12) is available, therefore utilities of
players are x = 12 , y =
1
2·b . Similarly, player 1 can increase
her demand for the second resource a until a · (2 − b) = 1.
This transition corresponds to a horizontal shift from point 2
to point 3 in Figure 3). Player 1 will have new allocation:
1−b
1−a′·b =
1
2·a′ >
1
2
Note, in that zone, player 2 could also increase her allocation
1
2·b by decreasing demand b. But after that transition, system
will enter zone I and both players will only increase their
demands afterwards. Therefore, we can omit that possibility.
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Fig. 3. Parameters space for 2-player case
Zone III: Point (13) is available, therefore utilities of
players are x = 12·a , y =
1
2 . Player 2 can increase allocation
the same way as player 1 can in zone II. This move will
correspond to a vertical transition from point in zone III (see
Figure 3).
Following theorem 2 we can conclude that the only stable
point is a = 1, b = 1. That corresponds to trivial demand
vectors and results in each player getting same amount of each
resource. This means absence of sharing incentives.
It is possible to prove a similar result in case of m > 2
resources. However, unlike the proof of theorem 2, one will
have to consider additional cases, where the maximum point
corresponds to intersection of several constraint lines at once.
In that case players will have to increase several demands at
once to shift a point of a global maximum in a desired way.
V. THREE PLAYERS CASE PROOF
In this section we consider 3-player case (i.e. n = 3, m =
3). We will also reformulate problem (1) as follows:
ln(x) + ln(y) + ln(z)→ max
subject to
x+ c · y + e · z ≤ 1,
a · x+ y + f · z ≤ 1,
b · x+ d · y + z ≤ 1,
x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, z ≥ 0,
(14)
where demand vectors are d1 = (1, a, b), d2 = (c, 1, d), and
d3 = (e, f, 1), 0 < a, b, c, d, e, f < 1. As in 2-player case, we
are interested only in that case because sharing incentives are
present only here. If two players would want more of a same
resource, allocation will not depend on their demands of other
resources at all, and problem could be reduced to a smaller
one.
We do not provide an exact solution for that problem as we
did for 2 players. It is possible to do so, however results will
be too bulky. Regardless, we provide a proof of breakage of
sharing incentives for 3 players. For the generality the case
with 3 players is much more significant than 2-player case.
While in 2-player case a player has a single opponent which
she plays against and whose allocation should be decreased
in order to increase own utility, in the 3-player case there
is no such opponent, and a decrease in the first opponent’s
allocation could always result in an increase in the second’s
opponent allocation. The latter degrades own allocation.
Because all constraints for variables x, y and z are linear
we can apply the method of Lagrange multipliers and Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
Theorem 3 (KKT conditions). There exist λ ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0, and
ν ≥ 0 such that:
x = 1λ+a·µ+b·ν
y = 1c·λ+µ+d·ν
z = 1e·λ+f ·µ+ν
λ(x+ c · y + e · z − 1) = 0
µ(a · x+ y + f · z − 1) = 0
ν(b · x+ d · y + z − 1) = 0
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1 λ, µ and ν are
Lagrange multipliers. Last equations are complementary slack-
ness conditions. Again, as all utilities should be strictly posi-
tive, Lagrange multipliers for last constraints in problem (14)
can be omitted.
There are 3 types of points satisfying necessary conditions:
1) All Lagrange multipliers are non zero. Single point of
this type is at the intersection of all three planes from
constrains of problem (14):
x =
∣∣∣ 1 c e1 1 f
1 d 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1 c ea 1 f
b d 1
∣∣∣ , y =
∣∣∣ 1 1 ea 1 f
b 1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1 c ea 1 f
b d 1
∣∣∣ , z =
∣∣∣ 1 c 1a 1 1
b d 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1 c ea 1 f
b d 1
∣∣∣ (15)
2) Two Lagrange multipliers are non zero. There are 3
such points on the intersections of each 2 planes. These
points can be considered, if they satisfy remaining linear
condition. If any of such points is available, they yield
a better value of the objective function than the point of
the first type. That observation can be made as a point
of the first type also lies on the same line in (x, y, z)
space.
Consider λ 6= 0 and µ 6= 0. Then we can describe a line
of intersection of first 2 planes in a parametric form:
x = 1−c1−a·c + (c · f − e)t
y = 1−a1−a·c + (a · e− f)t
z = (1− a · c)t
(16)
More equations can be added from theorem 3 to find the
optimal point on that line:
x = 1λ+a·µ
y = 1c·λ+µ
z = 1e·λ+f ·µ
(17)
3) Only one Lagrange multiplier is non-zero. There are 3
such points at each of 3 facets of a feasible set. From
theorem 3 it is possible to conclude that these points
are:
x = 13
y = 13·c
z = 13·e
or
x = 13·a
y = 13
z = 13·f
or
x = 13·b
y = 13·d
z = 13
(18)
If any of points of type 3 is feasible, it is an optimal
point. In fact these points are maximum points on
whole corresponding planes. Adding more restrictions
by intersecting these planes together will only reduce the
objective function. That is why these points are better
than any point of other type. Obviously only one point
of that type could be feasible.
Theorem 4 (Misbehavior for 3 players). For each 0 <
a, b, c, d, e, f < 1 it is possible for some player to adjust her
demands in such a way, that her utility defined by 14 will
increase.
Proof. Consider that global maximum is a point of type 1,
as discussed above. Utilities of players are defined by (15).
Consider utility of a first player x. Determinant in numerator
does not depend on a nor b. However, denominator can be
rewritten in a form:
∣∣ 1 f
d 1
∣∣+a · | d 1c e |+ b · | c e1 f |. If d · e− c < 0
then by increasing a, player 1 could increase her utility. If
c·f−e < 0 then player 1 could increase b leading to decreased
denominator, and thus, increasing utility. Note, that at least one
of conditions above is true.
Similar argument is possible to show, that c can be increased
if f · b − a < 0, d can be increased if a · e − f < 0, e — if
a · d− b < 0, and f — if b · c− d < 0.
However, it is possible to increase utility only until any
point of type 2 or 3 becomes feasible. Any further change
will not affect maximum point in a previous manner, as it will
be defined by another equations. At that time point of type 1
will coincide with point of another type. Because the function
has only one maximum at a feasibility set, continuous change
of demands will lead to continuous change of maximum point.
Therefore, continuous increase of parameters will eventually
make the point of type 1 coincide with a point of type 2 or 3.
We showed above, that each player can shift a point of type
1 into position with better utility until some point of other
type will coincide with point of type 1. To show misbehavior
possibility in all cases, we have to consider a situation, where
that happens. Assume that the first point of type 2 coincides
with point of type 1. Therefore all equations (15), (16),
and (17) hold.
First, we will show that either c · f − e < 0 or a · e− f <
0 (these are conditions to allow increase of b or d for type
1 point). If opposite holds, then ec ≤ f ≤ a · e, which is
impossible, as c < 1 and a < 1 and therefore ec > a · e.
Thus it is either beneficial to increase b or increase d. Both
actions will not affect equations (16) nor (17) and therefore
will not shift point of type 2. But these actions will make
that point unfeasible. Feasibility constraint for that point is:
x · b+ y · d+ z ≤ 1. That inequality is actually an equality for
that point, as points of type 1 and type 2 coincide. Any increase
in b or d will break that inequality and global maximum will
be of type 1. Utility of a player who increased her demand
will be larger after that increase, as from the previous case
applies.
Suppose that a point of type 3 coincides with a point of type
1. Let it be the first point of type 3 defined by (18). Because
point of type 3 is a maximum point for objective function and
because it lies on intersections of any two planes (by definition
of type 1) it is also a type 2 point for two lines on the first
plane. Therefore, global maximum is simultaneously a point of
type 1, point of type 3 and two points of type 2. Note, that all
points of type 2 can’t coincide as it will lead to all Lagrangian
multipliers to be zero for that point, which is impossible.
Suppose again, that first a point of type 2 coincides with
a point of type 1 and it is a global maximum. Similarly to
previous reasoning, it is possible to increase either b or d,
which will render all points of type 2 and 3 unfeasible and
will increase the value of the objective function for a point of
type 1, which will be a global maximum then.
Next, consider that the global maximum is reached at a point
of type 2 (not coinciding with point of type 1). Suppose that
it is a first point of type 2. Therefore equations (16) and (17)
apply. As they do not depend on b nor d it is possible to
increase these demands until x · b+ y · d+ z = 1. Then points
of type 1 and 2 will coincide and reasoning above applies. AS
shown above it is possible to further increase b or d for some
player to increase her utility.
Lastly, consider that the global maximum is reached at a
point of type 3. Let it be a point ( 13 ,
1
3·c ,
1
3·e ). It is possible for
a third player to increase her utility by decreasing demand e. It
can be done until point of type 3 coincides with point of type
2, as further decrease will render that point unfeasible and the
global maximum will no longer be defined by same equations.
Now, a second player can increase her utility by decreasing
c. Again it can be done until point of type 3 coincides with
another point of type 2. At that time the global maximum
will be on intersections of two lines, which means it is on
intersection of all planes and, in fact, is a point of type 1.
Now, reasoning above applies and players can increase their
allocation by increasing their demands.
Note, that in the last case, players also can increase a, b,
d, f . Because it does not affect the global maximum point,
it will not change players’ utilities until point of type 3 will
coincide with point of type 1. After that players could increase
their utilities by further increasing their demands.
Now we will state the main result of this section:
Theorem 5 (Stable point). Optimal players’ strategies con-
verge to demand vectors (1, 1, 1) for 3-player case.
Proof. As shown in theorem 4, only in one case players benefit
from decrease of their demands — then a point of type 3 is
the global maximum, not coinciding with a point of type 1.
But after optimal responses, game will enter and always stay
at the first case — the maximum is a point of type 1. Another
case, then point of type 2 is a global maximum leads to the
same case after some increase of demands.
We must show now, that this process will converge to all
demands equal to 1, not only some of them. Consider the
maximum is at a point of type 1. We will show that it is
always possible to increase the minimum demand. Suppose, w.
l. o. g., that a is the smallest demand among all 6 parameters.
Suppose it can’t be increased. Therefore c < e · d. If c can be
increased, it is possible to make it so, that a can be increased.
Suppose that c can’t be increased either, therefore a < f ·b. We
call that situation a deadlock. It is easy to see, that a < b ⇒
a · d < b and thus, e can be increased. Similarly d, e or f can
be increased. We argue that deadlock is impossible, because if
that state is reached, it is possible to reach a situation, where
b, d, e, and f are arbitrary close to 1. It follows from the fact,
that if the maximum is of type 1 we can increase the smallest
demand among that 4 until we reach a border case then type
1 and type 2 coincide. After that we would make some of
possible increases to make point of type 1 a maximum again.
Then we could continue to increase the smallest of demands.
However, point of type 1 is not a maximum for these
demands, as demand matrix is close to
(
1 c 1
a 1 1
1 1 1
)
, and point
of type 1 is arbitrary close to (0, 0, 1), which is obviously not
a maximum. But if deadlock were possible that state could be
reached with maximum still at the point of type 1.
Because deadlock is impossible, the smallest demand al-
ways can be increased and thus all demands vectors converge
to (1, 1, 1), which is the only stable point.
As in 2-player case, players have incentives to selfishly
increase their demand, until all demands are equal and there
are no sharing incentives at all.
VI. SIMULATIONS
In previous sections we have shown proofs of misbehavior
for 2 and 3 player cases. Unfortunately, solution for a large
number of tenants becomes more bulky. In order to verify
the tendency as well as to measure exact performance we
implemented a simulator that imitates behavior of individual
players in the system with shared resources. To support our
analytic results, we provide the simulation results for 2 to 15
players competing for 2 to 15 links.
We consider full bisection bandwidth datacenter topology
as in Falloc [2]. N tenants are competing for M links. In
this scenario there are M machines shared by all tenants
and N machines dedicated to each tenant. Each tenant is
gathering data from all shared machines to her dedicated
machine. Therefore N links are shared by all tenants and M
links are used by all flows of each tenant. M personal links
. . .
N
M
Fig. 4. Sample topology. Full-bisection bandwidth datacenter with M + N
machines. Flows of different tenants are marked with different styles.
have capacity 10 times more than shared N links. This is
so tenants would actually compete for shared resources and
not have bottlenecks on their personal links. Figure 4 shows
sample topology and flows in the datacenter.
Our simulator uses pricing mechanism to compute CEEI
by simulating auction, which results in the same allocation as
NBS (see section III-A). Each iteration some non-dominant
demand of each tenant is increased randomly and new allo-
cation is computed. If new allocation is not worse for some
tenant her increased demands are fixed. Using Monte-Carlo
method we randomly generated initial demands and simulated
misbehavior. Simulation results show that all demand vectors
converge to the same trivial demands, when each player
requests the same amount of each resource. Each experiment
is repeated 1000 times.
To investigate the impact of misbehavior we compared
average aggregated bandwidth before and after misbehavior.
Results are presented in Figure 5. In large datacenters mis-
behavior can reduce aggregated bandwidth by as much as
35%. We also compare NBS allocation with DRF [4]. We
chose DRF as a baseline for comparison, as it is a strategy-
proof mechanism to allocate multiple resources even in case of
proportional demands. As a trade-off in DRF aggregated band-
width is reduced, but not so much as in case of misbehavior
for NBS, see Figure 6. DRF allocation produces aggregated
bandwidth reduced only by less than 3.5% compared to 35%
in case of NBS.
Impact of misbehavior grows quickly for small numbers of
tenants/links. It is more sensitive to number of tenants than
to number of links. Therefore systems with large number of
players will suffer greater disadvantage. However even with
as few as 2 tenants NBS misbehavior can reduce aggregated
bandwidth by more than 10%.
DRF performs better when the number of links is in-
creased. This is because bigger number links results in more
constraints. Which makes set of feasible allocations more
symmetrical. Therefore NBS optimal point happens to be close
to DRF allocation. Degradation of aggregate bandwidth com-
pared to original NBS allocation grows slowly in number of
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Fig. 5. Average reduction of aggregated bandwidth due to misbehavior
in percentage.
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Fig. 6. Average reduction of aggregated bandwidth for DRF allocation
compared to NBS allocation in percentage.
tenants. However, compared to original NBS, the performance
deterioration is one order of magnitude less than misbehaving
NBS compared to the same original NBS.
It can be concluded, that NBS allocation achieves better
resources utilization than DRF. However, absence of sharing
incentives and misbehavior lead to significant loss in perfor-
mance. Therefore it is recommended to use DRF allocation
over any NBS-based allocation scheme in case where demands
are proportional.
VII. RELATED WORK
Recently, bandwidth allocation in data centers received
much attention from researchers. Various reservation-based
schemes including Oktopus [8], Gatekeeper [9] and Second-
Net [10] were proposed for bandwidth guarantees without
work conservation properties. Those often implement a hose
model [11] where each user is connected by a virtual link with
minimum guaranteed bandwidth.
FairCloud [12] analyzed the tradeoffs between payment pro-
portionality, high utilization and minimum bandwidth guaran-
tees. The authors proposed three allocation policies, including
PS-L for proportional sharing on the link-level, PS-N on the
network-level, and PS-P taking into account link proximity.
While FairCloud policies can be efficiently implemented in
switches, they lack the task concept which is necessary to
capture the dependency among allocations on links forming a
common path.
Several researchers suggested to utilize game theoretic ap-
proach to allocate bandwidth fairly. Yaiche et al. [13] used
Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) [3] to achieve fair alloca-
tion. Authors propose distributed method to calculate NBS.
Although that method provides Pareto efficient allocation for
given demand vectors, it does not account for ability of
users to lie about desired demand vectors. Falloc [2] provides
another method for finding NBS specifically for bandwidth
allocations in datacenter. That work also presents prototype
implementation of the suggested protocol using OpenFlow.
That solution is also distributed.
Another method to fairly allocate resources, coming from
microeconomic theory, is a Competitive Equilibrium from
Equal Incomes. With CEEI each user initially gets the same
amount of every resource and trades with other users in a per-
fectly competitive market. The outcome of CEEI corresponds
to NBS. It was shown that any market-pricing scheme for
multiple resources leads to CEEI allocation [5], [6]. It means
that given an equal budget to multiple players and a market-
driven prices, which are based on resource load, the players
end up allocating their budget with the same scheme as CEEI
allocation policy provides.
Another area of application of NBS and market-based
allocation policies in networking is a Spectrum Market. Zhu et
al. [14] proposes to use a market-based scheme, which leads to
CEEI allocation, to fully utilize scarce spectrum resources. In
a proposed multi-stage dynamic game optimal and collusion-
free spectrum allocation is achieved. Kash et al. [15] present
a scalable auction for spectrum sharing. Authors demon-
strate their algorithm’s ability to handle heterogeneous agent
types involving different transmit powers and spectrum needs
through extensive simulations. Niyato et al. [16] investigate
three different pricing models for spectrum sharing in cog-
nitive radio networks and provide solutions for these differ-
ent pricing models. In that work, distributed algorithms are
proposed to implement pricing models based on the theory
of discrete-time linear control system. It is also shown that
proposed algorithms converge to a stable solution.
Work [17] applies an auction based scheme for packet prior-
itization as a way to increase total utility among heterogeneous
user base.
Many mentioned methods utilize a game theoretic approach
to allocate resources in the network fairly. However, all
proposed methods assume that users do not lie about their
demands. We emphasize that such misbehavior is possible
and in fact beneficial for users, leading to absence of sharing
incentives for such allocation schemes.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Understanding properties of game-theoretic mechanisms for
allocations is important for modern network protocols. While
protocol designers suggest one or another allocation scheme
for network resources, generally they forget that demands may
be manipulable. In this work we show that NBS-based alloca-
tion is vulnerable to such manipulation in case of proportional
demands.
We consider intelligent players which optimize amount of
acquired resources and applications which are working on
multiple resources at once. We show that no NBS-based
allocation is strategy-proof in that case. Moreover intelligent
players adjust their demands slightly increasing own profit. In
the end, this iterative process results in an allocation without
any sharing-incentive, where each player receives degraded
performance, worse than what she gets before playing.
We prove these results for a 2-player game and a 3-
player game. The 2-player game is an important in providing
understanding of the misbehavior mechanism as well as exact
solution. On another hand, 3-player game is important to show
that third player is not breaking a degradation effect. While in
2-player game a player always has exactly one opponent which
allocation she needs to reduce, in 3-player game the reduction
of allocation of one player can increase allocation of another
player. In this work we show that this is not happening. While
we believe that we can prove this property in general case, the
analysis becomes more complex.
To study impact of misbehavior on aggregated bandwidth in
a datacenter we perform simulations for up-to 15 tenants and
up-to 15 shared links. We found that demands manipulation
severally deteriorates aggregated bandwidth. We also measure
performance of another game-theoretic allocation method,
namely DRF, and show that DRF allocation is preferable over
NBS-based allocation for any number of tenants and shared
links.
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